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Abstract
This paper studies economies with complete markets where there is positive default
on consumer debt. Households can default partially, at a nite punishment cost, and
competitive intermediaries price household's default risk individually. This environment
yields only partial insurance. The risk-based pricing of debt makes it too costly for the
borrower to achieve full insurance and there is too little trade in securities. Consump-
tion, as well as debt, are positively correlated with idiosyncratic changes in income.
This approach is in contrast with existing literature. Unlike the literature with default,
there are no restrictions on the set of state contingent securities that are issued. Unlike
the literature on lack of commitment, limited trade arises without debt constraints that
rule default out. The approach in this paper implies more consumption inequality.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies consumer credit default in an economy with complete nancial markets.
In spite of the evidence of consumer credit delinquency and bankruptcy, the existence of
positive default within this basic benchmark has received little attention in the literature
on limited commitment. Works that consider complete markets rule out positive default;
works that study equilibrium bankruptcy restrict the set of assets that can be traded. In
this paper, positive default coexists with complete markets. This environment provides a
novel explanation for nancial frictions (or incomplete trade) and has implications for un-
derstanding the evidence on consumption inequality.
The objectives of the paper are as follows. The rst is to put forward a simple and tractable
model that is suitable for the analysis of default with complete markets.1 The approach
rests on the existence of partial default and individualized risk-based pricing. The second
objective is to identify, in that context, reasons why default matters for the allocation of
resources, even in a frictionless competitive environment. It will study the consequences
of default for risk sharing (i.e., insurance) and intertemporal consumption smoothing. The
third objective is to assess the practical signicance of this risk-pricing approach. We will
compare its implications for consumption inequality with those from a model which { in
the vein of much literature on endogenous incomplete markets { has debt constraints that
rule out default.
Some motivation for entertaining partial default is in order. In the U.S., formal bankruptcy
lings have attracted much analysis and discussion, yet default outside formal bankruptcy
procedures is substantial. 2. Informal bankruptcy might account for the bulk of loan write-
os, a point already made by Dawsey and Ausubel (2004). Unlike the full discharge of
unsecured debts in formal procedures like Chapter 7, informal bankruptcy is best seen as
involving debtors failing to repay a chosen part of their liabilities. The signicance of in-
formal bankruptcy supports the present focus on partial default. Similarly, in the context
of sovereign debt, partial default seems to be the norm.3 Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik
(2005) also study partial default.
The simple general equilibrium model consists of a two-period endowment economy popu-
lated by two types of households who are subject to idiosyncratic endowment risk in the
second period. Regarding nancial markets, agents can borrow and lend freely through
1An early word on terminology is in order. Here, as in much literature on limited commitment (e.g.,
Kehoe and Levine (1993), Alvarez and Jermann (2000)) we speak of complete markets as the availability of
securities spanning the space of promised deliveries. This is a narrower notion than in Dubey, Geanakoplos,
and Shubik (2005) where tradeable assets are dened also over the level of default punishments, including
innite penalties. See below for further discussion.
2This is the theme of recent empirical and theoretical studies in Dawsey and Ausubel (2004), Dawsey,
Hynes, and Ausubel (2008) and Chatterjee (2010). In the Survey of Consumer Finances 2007, about 1% of
the U.S. population had led under Chapter 7, whereas over 5% held delinquent loans.
3See, for example, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2007).Consumer default with complete markets 3
perfectly competitive nancial intermediaries, and have access to a full set of securities.
Borrowers can default fully or partially on their promised deliveries. Default carries a util-
ity penalty to the household which depends on the scale of default. The same penalties
apply in all contracts. Because dierent levels of debt are associated with a dierent de-
fault rate, loans of dierent size command a dierent price. In order to characterize the
behavior of intermediaries and households, one needs to account for the price schedule asso-
ciated with all possible contracts, including those that are not traded in equilibrium. Using
specic functional assumptions, we characterise the equilibrium and draw analytical and
numerical results.
One key result is that bankruptcy on its own has real consequences for the allocation of
consumption. The reason is that prices reect the risk of dierent contract sizes in a way
that aect the borrowing and lending decisions in equilibrium. Since a borrower's marginal
gain in terms of current consumption from issuing debt is less than its price { a price wedge
{ an economy with endogenous bankruptcy will feature less trade in assets. Specically,
the possibility of bankruptcy implies imperfect consumption risk sharing and suboptimal
intertemporal consumption smoothing. Across states of nature in the second period, indi-
vidual consumption varies positively with income. If, as it is arguably the case, penalty
levels vary positively with household income, the model can also account for default de-
creasing with income.
It is critical that the default decisions are endogenous and that contracts are priced indi-
vidually. If default rates for each individual type and contingency were exogenous then the
price of claims would be given to households and allocations would be optimal, featuring
full risk sharing. If contracts were anonymous pools with a single price for asset sales of
dierent size, then the price faced by an individual borrower would not be sensitive to the
amount sold and there would be no price wedge, yielding full risk sharing.
In order to assess the implications for consumption inequality in this risk-pricing model,
we consider a debt-constrained version of the economy as a comparison benchmark. This
obtains naturally if the penalty for defaulting is xed regardless of its scale. Default, which
becomes in eect a zero-or-one choice, is ruled out and liabilities cannot exceed a certain en-
dogenous debt limit. The source of imperfect risk sharing is the same lack of commitment in
the two models, yet the mechanisms are quite dierent. For a class of symmetric economies,
the risk-pricing model encompasses less risk sharing and more consumption inequality than
the debt-constrained model. Illustrative numerical examples support this result more gen-
erally.
In considering complete markets, this paper is related to the large and inuential literature
on limited enforcement with complete markets. This includes Kehoe and Levine (1993),
Alvarez and Jermann (2000), Kehoe and Levine (2001), Krueger and Perri (2006), and Ke-
hoe and Perri (2002). Like those works, we also derive endogenous incomplete insuranceConsumer default with complete markets 4
given a full set of securities, but this is done without imposing an exogenous participation
constraint or not-too-tight borrowing limits. Furthermore, in the present paper there is
positive default in equilibrium, whereas these other papers rule out positive bankruptcy as
an equilibrium outcome. The case of these papers could be regarded as a special case of
ours were we to assume default is a discrete all-or-nothing decision. The existing literature
has used that framework to address important practical questions regarding consumption
and wealth inequality. The approach we propose should also be relevant for understanding
that evidence.4
This paper is also related to the recent quantitative literature on consumer credit and
bankruptcy. The works that undertake a quantitative general equilibrium analysis of in-
complete markets include Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima, and R os-Rull (2007), and Livshits,
MacGee, and Tertilt (2007), Mateos-Planas (2009), Mateos-Planas and R os-Rull (2010),
Benjamin and Mateos-Planas (2011), and Athreya, Tam, and Young (2009). The present
paper deals in a similar way with the pricing of default risk but does not rule out trade
opportunities arbitrarily by restricting the set of assets available. Unlike our paper, these
works also consider all-or-nothing default decisions.5
Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005) present a general model of default, accommodating
various specications of the tradeable set of assets. In the present paper, the set of trade-
able assets corresponds to a specication with Arrow securities and nite uniform default
punishment across assets.6 In contrast with the individualized risk-based pricing of assets
of the present paper, that paper treats assets as pools. The asset holder does not know the
identity or asset position of the assets seller, only the price and average default rate. As
already indicated, with pooling, default would have no impact on risk sharing.7 Compared
with the present paper, further arbitrary exogenous restrictions on the tradeable set would
have to be assumed in order to account for incomplete risk sharing under price pooling.
In the theoretical literature, default has been typically studied in models with incomplete
nancial markets. The emphasis has been on the role of default as providing some degree of
insurance against individual risk. This is the case, for example, in Zame (1993) and, again,
Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005). This paper studies instead situations where there
is a complete set of securities and insurance considerations are abstracted from. The role
of default in this context must be a distinct one.
4There is also a literature on endogenous limits with incomplete markets that similarly rules out positive
default in equilibrium. This includes Zhang (1997), Mateos-Planas and Seccia (2006),  Abrah am and C arceles-
Poveda (2010), and Andolfatto and Gervais (2008).
5Kehoe and Levine (2006) brings together the two streams by studying an economy with incomplete
markets and collateral constraints that reconciles the outcomes of the debt-constrained model with complete
markets.
6See their example 1, sec._ 6. In this general sense, this stops short of being complete markets as it fails
to span the space of all possible penalties. We have ruled out penalties as a dimension of assets and,
importantly, assets with innite punishment. Allowing for such assets, the rst best would always obtain.
7As long as default is not 100% causing trade in Arrow securities to collapse.Consumer default with complete markets 5
2 A basic model
The economy lasts for two periods. The possible states are s = 0;1;;;;S. In the rst period
the state is 0; in the second period the state of nature can be s = 1;::::;S. The probability of
a state s in the second period is denoted as s. There are two types i = A;B of individuals.
The two groups are of the same size. These agents receive endowments of goods that depend
on their type i and the state of nature s = 0;1;:::;S, and are denoted by yi
s. In the rst
period, agents can borrow or save against second-period states s = 1;:::;S using securities
traded through banks. Let ai
s denote the risk-free delivery values of the assets that pay in
state s held by an individual of type i. Let li
s denote the promised delivery values of the
loans held by an individual of type i that pay in state s. Let ps denote the price of assets
at 0. As for debts, since dierent levels of debt may carry a dierent risk of failure, the
price at 0 of debt held by agent i with promised delivery value l in state s is a function of
its face value Qi
s(l). A borrower can default on a fraction of their debt. Let di
s denote the
fraction of promised repayments li
s that borrower i fails to deliver in state s. Individuals
consume in each period their net available resources, and ci
s denotes consumption in state
s by an individual of type i.
Individual preferences are represented by a function of consumption and default. A borrower
who defaults experiences a utility stigma loss z that depends on the rate of default incurred
di
s. More specically, the utility of an individual of type i is represented by
u(ci
0) + 
X
s=1;:::;S
s[u(ci
s)   z(di
s)];
where u(:) is the period utility function and z(:) describes the penalty for default, and  is
a discount parameter. We will often use specic functional form for preferences, with
u(c) = logc
z(d) = d
(1)
where  and  are positive parameters accounting for the level and curvature of the penalty,
respectively.
Banks intermediate the trade in assets and debts. Their lending activity carries a risk of
default. Let Di
s(l) denote the default rate associated with a value l of promised deliveries
in state s by agent i. The revenues to the bank for lending l claims against state s to agent
i are then (1   Di
s(l))l. The costs to the bank consist of the delivery value of the deposits
taken a and an intermediation cost, a proportion  of the debt value. The bank's book
balancing requires the value of deposits taken to equalise the value of loans made, that isConsumer default with complete markets 6
Qi
s(l)l = psa. Therefore the bank's cash ow is:

1   Di
s(l)  
Qi
s(l)
ps
  

l:
There is an market open for loans of every possible size. All markets clear under perfect
competition and free entry in intermediation.
3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium determines the price of assets ps and, for all tradeable debt sizes l, the
price schedule Qi
s(l) and default risk risk schedule Di
s(l). There will be a single type of
borrower i under each state s. All traded loans are of a particular size li
s and carry a single
eective default rate di
s = Di
s(li
s) and price qi
s = Qi
s(li
s), if li
s > 0.
In order to determine these specic realizations, one will need to understand the values as-
sociated with o equilibrium allocations for contracts that are not traded, as described by
the mappings Qi
s(:) and Di
s(:). On one hand, consumers make their borrowing and default
plans bearing in mind how the interest charged changes with the liabilities through Qi
s(:).
On the other hand, banks bidding entry into the industry take into account the variation
in the risk of default associated with loans of dierent size through Di
s(:). In this model,
these o equilibrium expectations will be consistent with the assumption made that markets
for non traded contracts are open.8 We turn now to dening the equilibrium more precisely.
One remark about the equilibrium is that borrowing or savings will only be positive for one
agent in any state s = 1;:::;S. That is, if li
s > 0 then ai
s = 0, l
j
s = 0, and a
j
s > 0. This
allows us to use a sparser notation. The no-shortselling property is an equilibrium result
which will be further discussed below.
3.1 Denition
An equilibrium for the above economy consists of the following objects for each state s, and
for all agents i and j 2 fA;Bg: Traded prices qi
s and ps, price menus for debt Qi
s(:), default
functions Di
s(:), portfolios a
j
s and li
s, and consumption allocations ci
s and c
j
s, and default
rates di
s. They satisfy the following conditions:
(i) Consumer maximisation: For each i, given ps and Qi
s(:), the choices ai
s  0, li
s  0
8This is not unlike Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005)'s renement to prevent the existence of
markets being ruled out by excessively pessimistic expectations.Consumer default with complete markets 7
and di
s maximise utility for i subject to
ci
0 = yi
0  
X
s1
psai
s +
X
s1
Qi
s(li
s)li
s
and, if li
s > 0,
ci
s = yi
s   (1   di
s)li
s; s = 1;:::;S
or, if ai
s > 0,
ci
s = yi
s + ai
s; s = 1;:::;S
(ii) O-the-equilibrium default: For a given loan size l > 0, the value of the default
function schedule Di
s(l) is the ~ d that maximises agent i's utility in state s, u(ci
s) (~ d),
subject to
ci
s = yi
s   (1   ~ d)l; s = 1;:::;S :
(iii) Bank competition: Given the default schedule Di
s(:), the price menu Qi
s(:) satises
zero-prot on condition any potential credit contract size l.
(iv) Consistency: the traded price corresponds to the traded contracts
qi
s = Qi
s(li
s); li
s > 0
and the default rate corresponds to the traded contract
di
s = Di
s(li
s); li
s > 0:
(v) Market clearing: X
i
ci
0 =
X
i
yi
0;
X
i
ci
s +
X
i
li
s =
X
i
yi
s;
X
i
qi
sli
s =
X
i
psai
s:
In point(i) the budget constraint shows that the borrower i bears in mind the eect of the
level of debt on the price through Qi
s(:). More specically, if li
s > 0, for the borrower the
optimality condition for debt is
u0(ci
0)
h
qi
s + Qi
s
0
(li
s)li
s
i
= u0(ci
s)(1   di
s)s; li
s > 0 (2)
where use has been made of the condition in (iv). Regarding the default choice,
u0(ci
s)li
s = z0(di
s); li
s > 0 (3)Consumer default with complete markets 8
For the lender with li
s = 0, the standard conditions for optimal savings holds, so
u0(ci
0)ps = u0(ci
s)s; li
s = 0 (4)
Point (ii) describes the default behavior for arbitrary levels of debt. The optimality condi-
tion in this case is analogous to the condition for the equilibrium allocation (3), so Di
s(l)
solves
u0(yi
s   (1   Di
s(l))l)l = z0(Di
s(l)) all l > 0: (5)
Note that, because of separability of the utility function, the default menu has the convenient
property that it does depend on the price schedule Qi
s(:). Point (iii) describes the zero-prot
condition for all loan sizes. Given the expression for the bank's cash-ow presented earlier,
this can be written more explicitly as:
1   Di
s(l)  
Qi
s(l)
ps
   = 0 all l > 0: (6)
The denition of the price of debt traded in equilibrium in point (iv) along with the fact
just discussed that the realised default di
s = Di
s(li
s) if li
s > 0, permits writing an analogous
expression specically for the active intermediaries:9
1   di
s  
qi
s
ps
   = 0 (7)
Point (v) describes clearing in the goods markets and nancial markets, the latter implying
qi
sli
s = psa
j
s when li
s > 0. Combining these market clearing conditions with the budget
constraints in point (i) and the zero-prot condition (7), one can write the consumption
allocation as follows:
ci
0 = yi
0 +
P
s ps(yi
s   li
s   ci
s)
ci
s = yi
s   (1   di
s)li
s; li
s > 0
c
j
s = y
j
s + (qi
s=ps)li
s; l
j
s = 0
(8)
Note that (7) implies that the last equality can be written as c
j
s = y
j
s + (1   di
s   )li
s.
3.2 Characterisation
The set of equations (2), (3), (4), (7) and (8) forms a system in the endogenous variables
consisting of prices ps and qi
s, debt promised deliveries li
s, default di
s, and consumption
allocations ci
0 and ci
s, for i = A;B and s = 1;:::;S. However this system does not fully
determine the outcomes because it cannot deal with the sensitivity of the price of debt to
changes in the borrowing decision expressed in the derivative of the price schedule Qi
s
0 in
(2). The two remaining equations (5) and (6) precisely describe the pattern for default and
pricing which is needed to pin down this derivative. Therefore, in order to characterise the
9Portfolios for an individual could not have both l
i
s and a
i
s positive. For the two (interior) conditions (2)
and (4) to hold, it is required that q
i
s=ps > 1   d
i
s, a contradiction with (7).Consumer default with complete markets 9
equilibrium, we will rst study the properties of the price menu implied by (5) and (6).
To be specic, we will consider the functional forms for utility and stigma costs in (1). The
default mapping Di
s(l) is determined from (4) as the solution to
l
yi
s   (1   Di
s(l)l)
= Di
s(l) 1:
Computing its derivative Di
s
0(l) and, using condition (2) with (7), evaluating it at the
equilibrium li
s, one obtains:
Di
s
0
(li
s) =
1   di
s + 1
di
s
1 

1
di
s
    1

(   1) + 
1
li
s
Now the zero-prot condition (5), with (6), shows that the change in the price of debt with
liabilities has the opposite sign, Qi
s
0(l) =  qi
s(1   di
s   ) 1Di
s
0(l). With this information,
one can nd an explicit expression for the change in the amount that one can borrow by
incurring extra debt:
qi
s + Qi
s
0
(li
s)li
s = qi
s(1   di
s   ) 1
"
di
s
 
(   1)di
s
  + 
((1   di
s)(   1)   di
s)   
#
(9)
This term (9) has to be positive in an equilibrium with positive borrowing and lending
where (2) holds. By incurring more liabilities for tomorrow, the borrower must be able to
raise more consumption today. Note that the default penalty being steep enough, or  > 1,
is a necessary condition for this to happen. On the other hand, this condition guarantees
that, o the equilibrium, the default risk increases and hence the debt price decreases with
the value of debt promised repayments.
Proposition 1 Assume the functional forms in (1). Then qi
s + Qi
s
0(li
s)li
s is given by (9).
In an equilibrium with positive borrowing its sign must be positive and so  > 1. In such an
equilibrium, Di
s
0(li
s) > 0 and Qi
s
0(li
s) < 0.
Note  > 1 is a weak condition for existence. We will often invoke from (9) the stronger
condition that    1   di
s=(1   di
s) > 0, which involves the endogenous default rates.
4 Risk sharing and smoothing
In this section, we discuss the properties of the equilibrium regarding risk sharing and the
consequences of default for the intertemporal allocations of consumption. For each of the
two issues, we proceed in two steps. We rst consider the case where default is exogenous
as the standard benchmark where there is full risk sharing and default does not matter.Consumer default with complete markets 10
Then we study the model with endogenous default in order to establish and explain that
these properties do not hold. This section will conclude with a discussion of the pattern of
default and a comparison with an economy with assets' pooling.
To facilitate the discussion we will assume away intermediation costs and set  = 0. Also,
we assume there is no aggregate risk so yi
s + y
j
s is a constant y for all s.
4.1 Risk sharing
Consider rst the situation where the default rates di
s are exogenous. An equilibrium is still
characterized by the above conditions except (3), (5) and (6), and with the property that
risk does not depend on loan size or Qi
s
0(l) = 0.
In this setting with exogenous default, the rst-order conditions (2) and (4), alongside the
no-arbitrage condition (7) that ps = qi
s=(1   di
s), imply the equalization of the intertempo-
ral marginal rates of substitution of the two agents in each state, that is u0(ci
s)=u0(ci
0) =
u0(c
j
s)=u0(c
j
0). On the other hand, the market clearing condition (8) implies that ci
s+c
j
s = y.
Combining these two properties,
u0(ci
s)
u0(y   ci
s)
=
u0(ci
0)
u0(c
j
0)
:
It follows that consumption of any agent is invariant to the state s. There is, in other words,
complete risk sharing. The intuition for this result is standard. With default rates given
exogenously, no-arbitrage prices fully account for the incomplete repayment of promised
deliveries. Technically, no-arbitrage prices lead to the equalization of marginal rates of sub-
stitution across agents.
We turn now to the case with endogenous default. The equilibrium is described by equa-
tions (2), (3), (4), (7) and (8) with (9). Complete risk sharing fails to hold in this case.
Although the same no-arbitrage condition stands, there is no equalization of marginal rates
of substitution across agents. The reason is that the borrower household takes into account
the endogenous response of the price to their loan choice. More formally, let i the agent
that borrows against a particular state s. First, from intertemporal optimality in (2) and
(4) we obtain, respectively,
u0(ci
s)
u0(ci
0)
=
qi
s + Qi
s
0(li
s)li
s
(1   di
s)s
;
and
u0(c
j
s)
u0(c
j
0)
=
ps
s
:
Now the no-arbitrage condition (7) that ps = qi
s=(1   di
s) does not imply equalization of
marginal rates of substitution as long as Qi
s
0 6= 0. Combining these expressions with marketConsumer default with complete markets 11
Intertemporal
optimality
Optimal
default
Income up
Figure 1: Equilibrium di
s and ci
s when type i is a debtor in s.
clearing (8), one obtains:
u0(ci
s)
u0(y   ci
s)
=
qi
s + Qi
s
0(li
s)li
s
qi
s
u0(ci
0)
u0(c
j
0)
:
The gap between the marginal rate of substitution of the borrower and the lender in a
particular state is given by the term (qi
s +Qi
s
0(li
s)li
s)=qi
s < 1, to be compared with a value of
1 in the risk sharing case above. This price ratio is the current marginal gain to borrowing
relative to the marginal cost to saving. It turns out that it is a negative function of the
default rate di
s: higher default is associated with steeper borrowing costs. Therefore in
general full risk sharing will fail to hold as long as default varies across states s. To see this
more explicitly, using (9), we can write this expression as
u0(ci
s)
u0(y   ci
s)
=
1
(   1) + di
s


   1  
di
s
1   di
s

u0(ci
0)
u0(c
j
0)
: (10)
So individual consumption levels vary with the default rate di
s in a given state s. More
specically, the borrower's consumption ci
s increases with the default rate. With higher
default and the resulting increased costs of borrowing, this individual will have borrowed
less against s and can consume more in that state. The implications of (10) can be summa-
rized graphically by the positively sloped curve in Figure 1 associated with intertemporal
optimality.Consumer default with complete markets 12
The optimal choice of default provides another key relation between the default rate and
consumption of an individual who is in debt. The optimality condition for default (3), using
the functional assumptions in (1) and market clearing (8), can be written as
yi
s   ci
s
ci
s
= (1   di
s)di
s
 1
: (11)
This expression relates consumption, default and the endowment in a particular state. It
will be important to know how the right-hand side of this expression changes with the
default rate. Its derivative has the same sign as (   1)=   di
s so the RHS of (11) is
hump shaped. Now, the fact discussed that the RHS of (9) is positive implies that, given
 > 1, the sign of the expression    1   di
s=(1   di
s) must be positive. It follows that
(   1)=   di
s > 0 so the RHS of (11) is increasing in the default rate di
s. This implies
that more consumption leads to a lower default rate. With a lower marginal utility, the
household is in less need to prop up consumption by means of shunning promised deliveries.
Graphically, this relationship (11) is represented as the negatively sloped optimal default
curve in Figure 1.
We discuss now how individual consumption changes across states s. We consider rst
changes where the household i remains the debtor so (10) and (11) apply throughout.
Suppose that the income endowment yi
s increases across two states s. Condition (11) can be
rewritten yi
s = ci
s+ci
s(1 di
s)di
s
 1. Given the positive relationship between consumption
and default from (10), the state with higher income will have a higher consumption if the
RHS of (11) is increasing in di
s, a property we have just established. More intuitively,
for given consumption, a larger endowment means the household must have higher debts
and defaults more (i.e., (11)); markets read steeper interest rates into this and households
borrow less in the rst place and consume more in the second period (i.e., (10)). Graphically
in Figure 1, consider the equilibrium allocation in state s as the intersection of the two solid
curves. For a state with a larger endowment, the optimal default curve lies further to the
right, implying a higher level of consumption.
Proposition 2 (Imperfect income risk sharing with constant roles) Across states s where
type i is the debtor, its consumption ci
s and income endowment yi
s are positively correlated.
Note that the response of consumption to the rise in idiosyncratic income is mediated by
a rise in default which, by increasing the cost of further borrowing in equilibrium, deters
the accumulation of debt. However, this positive association between income and default is
not a necessary implication of the theory if there is some other factors aecting the cost of
borrowing that also changes with individual income. This will be discussed below.
Consider now comparisons across states where a particular household changes role. That
is, suppose an equilibrium where agent i holds debt in state s and holds assets in anotherConsumer default with complete markets 13
state s0. Again, optimal borrowing against state s is characterized using (2) by
u0(ci
s)
u0(ci
0)
=
qi
s + Qi
s
0(li
s)li
s
(1   di
s)s
;
and optimal saving against state s0 reads from (4) as
u0(ci
s0)
u0(ci
0)
=
ps0
s0
=
q
j
s0
(1   d
j
s0)s0
;
where the last equality follows from the zero-prot condition (7). Now perfect risk sharing
amounts to having an equality between the two RHS terms in these two expressions. We
show this cannot be true by way of contradiction. Assuming this equality, the property
that Qi
s
0(:) < 0 implies that qi
s=((1   di
s)s) > q
j
s0=((1 d
j
s0)s0). From market clearing in
(8), there must also be risk sharing for agent j, which, by an analogous argument, means
that the contrary inequality must hold. The same argument can be used to establish that
risk-sharing fails to hold in the sense that
qi
s + Qi
s
0(li
s)li
s
(1   di
s)s
<
q
j
s0s
(1   d
j
s0)s0
: (12)
The marginal cost to debt exceeds the marginal return to savings. This property together
with the preceding two expressions implies that ci
s > ci
s0. That is, a household's consumption
is higher in the states where they hold debt than in the states where they hold savings. Given
this we can also establish how income correlates with consumption. Consumption levels for
household i are determined from (8) as ci
s = yi
s (1 di
s)li
s and ci
s0 = yi
s0+(1 d
j
s0)l
j
s0. The fact
that ci
s > ci
s0 clearly requires that yi
s > yi
s0 so consumption and income are positively related.
Proposition 3 (Default, debt/saving and consumption with changing roles) Across states
s where household i switches between debtor and saver, its consumption ci
s, debt level li
s and
income endowment yi
s are positively correlated.
Having established that risk sharing fails, some further intuition might be helpful. One
way to gain this intuition is by comparison the the outcomes for an economy where default
rates are exogenous but coincide with the equilibrium default rates of our economy. Con-
sider the constraints that determine consumption in (8). In both economies, consumption
changes less than income as the household holds more debt liabilities in states where income
is higher. In the exogenous-default case the portfolio composition varies across states to
an extent that neutralizes the eect of income on consumption. In our endogenous-default
economy, portfolios also adjust but to a lesser extent thus making consumption responsive
to income. So the key point behind imperfect risk sharing is that households stop short
of arranging their portfolios as needed to achieve complete consumption smoothing. Why
is that? The interest rate faced by the household rises with the level of the debt issued.Consumer default with complete markets 14
This makes them more cautious about taking large debt positions needed to fully insure
consumption. This is a reection that nancial markets price the fact that risk depends on
individual (borrowing) decisions.
Interestingly, we have found that, with a complete set of assets, default is not insurance but
rather the opposite. This is in contrast with the role generally ascribed to default in the
incomplete markets literature.10
4.2 Consumption smoothing
We also would like to discuss how, for the same default rates, the economy with endogenous
default and the economy with exogenous default dier in terms of allocations and prices.
By construction, the risk premium is the same in the two economies. Therefore, one needs
to gure out how the level of interest rates and hence consumption dier between them.
The simplest way to make this point is to consider a deterministic version of the model,
with only one state in the second period. One can now compare this economy with the
analogous case where default is exogenous, and the default rate is the same. The main
dierence between these two economies is found in the intertemporal optimality condition
for the borrower in equation (2). For given prices of debt, with endogenous default the
borrower faces a steeper interest rate, or a lower marginal benet to issuing debt. She
will issue less debt and consume less in the rst period compared to the exogenous case.
In equilibrium, a higher price of debt brings about the corresponding reduction in lending
from the lender according to (4). Therefore, there is less consumption smoothing in the
case where default is endogenous.
4.3 The relationship between income and default
In the previous analysis of Figure.1, higher income leads to more default. This might be a
problematic implication but is not a fundamental consequence of the model. It comes about
only because of the simplifying maintained assumption that the punishment parameter 
is the same for all individuals in all states. The punishment could plausibly be increasing
in the level of individual income. Creditors can collect more from higher earnings; legal
bankruptcy protection is often means tested.11 If this is the case, higher income can cause
the default rate to decrease and still have consumption increasing.
10See also Athreya, Tam, and Young (2009).
11Another argument is that the punishment could be a function of the absolute value of the debt reneged
upon rather than, as we have postulated, its proportion. We do not analyze this explicitly in order to
preserve the sought tractability.Consumer default with complete markets 15
Intertemporal
optimality
Optimal
default
y up
h up
h up
Figure 2: Equilibrium di
s and ci
s when type i is a debtor in s. A rise in income yi
s and i
s
increases consumption and lowers default.
To see this dene i
s as the default penalty for an individual of type i in state s, and
substitute it for  in (10) and (11). Consider a change in the state s such that income
yi
s goes up. Suppose this also implies a rise in i
s. The graphic analysis in Figure. 2 will
suce to make the point. As seen before, the increase in the endowment of income yi
s
shifts the default optimality curve to the right. The associated increase in the parameter
for the cost of default i
s reduces default and shifts this curve back to the left. On the other
hand, the higher cost of default reduces borrowing and increases consumption thus shifting
the intertemporal optimality curve upwards. Note that the change in the punishment i
s
can always be chosen to overturn the eect of income and leave the optimal default curve
unchanged, in which case higher consumption and lower default follow as income rises. The
same type of outcome still obtains when, as depicted in Figure.2, the reaction of the default
cost is smaller.
4.4 Pooling
Dubey, Geanakoplos, and Shubik (2005) have studied situations where contracts of dierent
size are pooled together. In the context of our model, pooling means that there is a single
price qi
s, rather than a menu of prices, for debt sold by agent i with delivery in state s,
irrespective of the amount sold li
s. In other words, the menu of prices Qi
s(:) is a at func-
tion. Formally, the equilibrium is characterized as before except that in the intertemporal
optimality condition for the borrower (2) the term Qi
s
0(li
s) = 0. A consequence is that thisConsumer default with complete markets 16
economy achieves the rst best allocation with full risk sharing. Although, by virtue of
(3), default rates are endogenous, market prices account for the event of default eciently.
This observation underscores the conclusion that risk-based pricing of loans is an essential
ingredient in our explanation of endogenous nancial frictions. Risk pooling is not only an
exogenous assumption but also one that necessitates further exogenous degrees of market
incompleteness in order to account for imperfect insurance.
5 Consumption inequality: risk-pricing or debt-constraints
This section discusses the dierences between the present risk-pricing model and the debt-
constrained model regarding the implications for consumption inequality. The ability of
dierent models for understanding the evidence on risk-sharing has been the subject of
an important body of quantitative literature (e.g., Krueger and Perri (2006), Kaplan and
Violante (2010)). The conclusion that seems to emerge is that the debt-constrained model
in the Kehoe and Levine (1993) tradition underestimates inequality. It is thus important
to understand how the risk-pricing model could comparatively perform on this dimension.
The debt-constrained economy obtains by changing the specication of the punishment
technology z in (1). It suces to assume that the utility penalty is a xed amount, equiv-
alent to the punishment for fully defaulting , independently of the scale of default. This
assumption would naturally lead defaulters to default on all their debts. This being so will
cause intermediaries not to oer loans that induce any default (i.e., to command a price of
zero). This results in a situation where loans traded carry no default risk, so lending rates
are risk free so (7) implies qi
s = ps, but the size of loans is constrained by the maximum debt
that would trigger default. Formally, individuals of type i face a debt limit against state
s that we denote l
i
s. This is determined as the value that makes the individual indierent
between defaulting or not:
u(yi
s)    = u(yi
s   l
i
s): (13)
Faced with such a limit to the value of debt that can be sold, the consumer optimality
condition that replaces (2) and (4) is
psu0(ci
0)  su0(ci
s) (14)
with strict equality if the debt constraint does not bind, and generically an inequality when
the constraint binds li
s = l
i
s. This economy features imperfect risk sharing if in some states
and for some households the debt constraint binds.
One can argue that, at least for some level of the default penalty, the risk-pricing model
brings about more inequality than the debt-constrained economy. We have discussed that
there is imperfect risk sharing in the risk-pricing economy as long as there is positive default
in equilibrium. For any nite penalty, there will always be some default in that setting.
On the other hand, in the debt-constrained economy one can surely nd a large enoughConsumer default with complete markets 17
punishment that makes consumption inequality zero. By a continuity argument, there
will also be a region where the debt-constrained economy has binding debt limits and
incomplete insurance but still displays less inequality than the risk-pricing economy. While
some especial assumption on the punishment technology made in this paper might play a
part, it betrays the sense that the risk-pricing economy might have less risk-sharing more
generally. If default can be partial, there will be more states where default and hence the
distortion that follows is positive.
5.1 A symmetric case
We use a specic version of the model to establish analytically the lower degree of risk shar-
ing in the risk-pricing economy compared to the debt-constrained economy. The two types
of households have the same initial endowment y0, with the aggregate income y = 2y0.
There are only two states s in the second period. In one state, one type of household
receives a high income yl and the other type receives a low realization ya (the choice of
subscripts will become clear very soon); in the other state, the allocation of endowments
across household types is the reverse. The total endowment is as in the initial period so
yl + ya = y. The two states occur with the same probability  = 1=2. The two types of
households are therefore ex-ante identical.
In an equilibrium with trade, the allocations of debt l, assets a and default d, and the prices
of debt and assets q and p, are all independent of the state. Consumption in the rst period
c0 is the same for the two types of households. In the second period, the household who
receives the high endowment yl owes promised deliveries of debt l and consumes cl; the
households with the low endowment ya holds claims a and consumes ca. These values of
consumption are independent of the contingent state s. Is is simple to dene a measure of
risk sharing, , as the dierence between the high income endowment yl and consumption
in that state cl:
  yl   cl 2 [0;1=2(yl   ya)]: (15)
Zero risk sharing obtains when  = 0 and consumption matches the endowment; full risk
sharing occurs when the total endowment is evenly split and cl = 1=2(yl + ya). A lower 
is associated with more consumption inequality.
Given the symmetry of outcomes, the equilibrium of the risk-pricing economy can be writ-
ten explicitly in terms of two relationships involving the default rate d and the degree of
risk sharing . The rst relation comes from the intertemporal optimal borrowing/lending
conditions for the household (2) and (4). Having used market clearing y = ca +cl from (8),
no-arbitrage p(1   d) = q from (7), the risk-based price term from (9), and the denition
in (15), we nd the cost-of-borrowing condition:
u0(yl   )
u0(y   yl + )
=
1
(   1) + d

   1  
d
1   d

(16)Consumer default with complete markets 18
This traces a negative relation between the default rate d and the extent of risk sharing
.12 The RHS term is the price term from (9) that captures the distortion or wedge that
risk-pricing brings about. As discussed earlier, this is a negative function of the default
rate d as it makes it more costly for the household to borrow. The LHS is the relative
marginal utility of the consumer in the good state which is positively related to risk sharing
. A higher default rate reduces debt and hence increases consumption in the good state
thus decreasing risk sharing. The second relationship between d and  derives from the
condition for optimal default (3). Using the budget relation l(1 d) = yl  cl from (8), the
optimal-default condition reads:
u0(yl   )

1   d
= d 1 (17)
It describes a positive relation between risk sharing and the default rate. More risk shar-
ing means higher debt liabilities in the good state and consequently a bigger incentive to
default. An equilibrium is values  and d solving (16) and (17).
Consider now the equilibrium in the debt-constrained economy. In the case where the
penalty  is large enough that the debt constraint is never binding the conclusion is straight-
forward. This economy has perfect insurance and, consequently, less inequality than the
risk-based pricing economy. We turn to the more interesting case where the debt limit
binds. In the present symmetric environment, the value of consumer liabilities l coincides
with the debt limit l which, by the consumer budget in (8), is related to the household's
consumption in his good state by l = yl   cl. The participation condition (13), with the
denition in (15), allows us to characterize the degree of risk sharing in the debt-constrained
economy as the value  solving
u(yl   )   [u(yl)   ] = 0 (18)
The LHS is the gain to not defaulting, a decreasing function of . For a higher degree of
risk sharing, the high-income household would be better o by choosing to default.
We now compare the value of  that solves (16) and (17) for the risk-pricing economy, with
the one that solves (18) for the debt-constrained economy. We will now use the log utility
assumption from (1). In the risk-pricing model, we know the default rate cannot exceed the
maximum consistent with existence, that is d < d  (  1)=. Then the default optimality
condition (17) implies that the degree of risk sharing under risk-pricing is bounded from
above by
yl
1=d
 1
+ :
We now evaluate the participation condition on the LHS of (18) for the debt-constrained
12Naturally, we will be supposing that the condition for existence discussed earlier   1 d=(1 d) holds.Consumer default with complete markets 19
model at this level of risk sharing. This yields
 log(1 + d
 1
) +  > 0;
implying that this level of risk sharing is too low to be an equilibrium for the debt-
constrained economy. We have thus established that there is more consumption inequality
in our risk-based pricing economy.
Proposition 4 Consider the symmetric case. Given the same penalty parameter , the
risk-pricing model generates less risk sharing and more consumption inequality than the
debt-constrained model.
5.2 Numerical illustration
At this point, we resort to numerical examples to illustrate this result as well as the fact that
equilibrium existence is not a degenerate ction. Only two random states s are assumed.
The rst example has symmetric consumers where the only dierence is the state when they
get the bad shock, but the probability is the same. This corresponds to the setting studied
in Proposition 4. The parameters are  = 1, yi
0 = 0:50 all i, equal probabilities s = 0:50,
symmetric income processes yi
s, (0:60;0:40), and punishment  = 0:12 and  = 3:0. It
suces the consider outcomes for just one agent. Example 1 shows the results for the two
economies and, as a benchmark reference, those under full risk-sharing for an economy with
commitment. The risk-pricing model delivers far more consumption volatility and less trade
in assets. This is reected in a lower risk-free lending rate and higher borrowing rates. This
is a conservative example in that it sets a considerably low default penalty. Mild punishment
parameters, needed in order to generate some inequality in the debt-constrained economy,
are associated with very large default rates in the risk-pricing economy.
Example 1: symmetric case
risk-sharing risk-pricing debt-constraints
ci
0 0.500 0.500 0.500
fci
sg (0.500, 0.500) (0.583, 0.417) (0.532, 0.468)
li
s 0.100 0.0268 0.0678
ps 0.500 0.599 0.534
ds { 0.357 0.000
qs 0.500 0.385 0.534
 l { { 0.0678
The previous example focuses on within period insurance only. The second example involves
eects on smoothing over time as well. This is an asymmetric economy in that household A,
having a back-loaded endowment prole, borrows against all future states. The parameters
are as follows:  = 1, s = 0:50 all s, yA
0 = 0:40, fyA
s g = (0:54;0:48), yB
0 = 0:60, fyB
s g =
(0:46;0:52). The punishment parameters are the curvature  = 3:0, and the penalty level
 = 0:20 for the risk-pricing model. For the debt-constrained model, we assume a milder
xed punishment of 0.10. Note this dierent choice works against the contention that theConsumer default with complete markets 20
debt-constrained model features less inequality and should strengthen the point.13 The
results are displayed in the next table as Example 2. The debt-constrained model has the
limit binding only in one of the states and individuals can achieve perfect intertemporal
smoothing in the other state. We see that the risk-pricing economy generates less smoothing
both over time and across states since there is less trade.
Example 2: asymmetric case
risk-sharing risk-pricing debt-constraints
cA
0 0.4550 0.4227 0.4452
fcA
s g (0.4550, 0.4550) (0.5133, 0.4673) (0.4887, 0.4452)
cB
0 0.5450 0.5773 0.5548
fcB
s g (0.5450, 0.5450) (0.4867, 0.5327) (0.5113, 0.5548)
lA
s (0.085, 0.025) (0.0424, 0.0168) (0.0513, 0.0348)
ps (0.500, 0.500) (0.5931, 0.5419) (0.5420, 0.5000)
qA
s (0.500, 0.500) (0.3729, 0.4094) (0.5420, 0.5000)
ds { (0.3712, 0.2445) {
 lA
s { { (0.0513, 0.0457)
 lB
s { { (0.0438, 0.0494)
6 Concluding remarks
Risk-based pricing and partial default in consumer credit can help to account for limited
trade even when there is a complete set securities. The specic mechanism diers from
the existing literature on debt-contrained economies. The individualized pricing of default
in this paper brings about price wedges that distort the borrowing decisions. This model
seems to imply more consumption inequality than the debt-constrained model typical of
much applied literature on the subject. This property might prove signicant for under-
standing the evidence.
This analysis can be extended fruitfully in various directions. First, one can investigate with
this novel approach the ability of dierent factors to account for the observation of rising
bankruptcy and the expansion of credit and levels of debt. This type of questions have only
being pursued in incomplete markets economies. Second, bankruptcy matters even without
the frictions introduced by market incompleteness. This insight might prove important for
a better understanding of nancial frictions and welfare policy in actual economies.
The model in this paper is deliberately simple and, in the interest on analytical tractability,
exploits some specic functional assumption. In order to draw rm practical conclusions, a
quantitative model of risk-pricing with complete markets is called for. This is being pursued
in ongoing research.
13Furthermore, with same  = 0:20, the debt-constrained model produces full risk sharing.Consumer default with complete markets 21
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